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• The euro is a new currency, and the ECB as a new institution still has to establish its reputation. The best way to do
this is for the ECB to deliver a stable money. The two-pillar strategy pursued by the ECB seems to confuse the
markets because market participants are unclear about which of the two pillars is the dominating one. The ECB will
have to rethink its strategy and move more in the direction of the monetary targeting approach.
• A central bank cannot have two nominal anchors for its currency, both the internal price level and the external value
of a currency. Admittedly, a low external value may translate into inflationary expectations or expectations on further
depreciations. These effects cannot be neglected by the ECB. Therefore, it has to factor in the impact of depreciation
on the future price level.
• Member countries of the common currency area may free ride on the common currency. Although a Minhas Gerais
problem in the European Monetary Union is unlikely, countries with high indebtedness may put pressure on the ECB
to follow a rather lax monetary policy characterized by low interest rates and a (slightly) higher inflation rate than the
one anticipated by financial markets. The stability pact has to shield the ECB against such pressures.
• National economic policies in the three major continental countries, Germany, France, and Italy, have severe
difficulties in establishing the necessary institutional conditions in the national labor markets for a smooth functioning
of the common currency. Interest groups in the member countries will defend their political position and will resist
necessary institutional changes. Wage policy should be decentralized and not europeanized. Employment policy
should not be europeanized either.
• In attracting new members, care must be taken not to increase the heterogeneity of the monetary union. This relates
to the candidates for new EU membership; they will need the exchange rate for quite some time. For the UK, only a
short time window in which the business cycle in the UK and that in EMU are in a similar phase will allow entry.
• Two types of conflict have to be distinguished: "Type-1 conflict" is a conflict between the monetary authority and
politics on the weight that should be assigned to a stable money or to other targets. "Type-2 conflict" is a conflict
between national political decision-making and the europeanized monetary policy in the case of a major national
economic crisis. The worst case that can be envisioned for the new monetary arrangement is a fundamentally
divergent economic situation in a major country while at the same time the other economies in the rest of euroland
are doing fine. An ingredient of such a scenario would be a major national crisis, for instance a homemade crisis due
to severe policy failure. Such a major crisis will be the real test for the euro.
• Politics has to accept the depolitization and the denationalization of the common monetary policy. Relying on
goodwill may not be sufficient to solve potential conflicts. Mechanisms have to be developed that make sure that
goodwill is not the only basis for withstanding a major crisis. One way is to change the democratic set-up of political
decision-making by giving more weight to European aspects. This raises severe questions which relate to the
political concept for Europe and its federal structure, to the issue of a European constitution, and to the very basic
question whether a European sovereign — a European people — is beginning to exist. Another approach is to
create a European audience for the ECB's policy as well as for economic policy issues in general. Establishing a
European Council of Economic Advisers is a step in this direction.
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The euro has passed its freshman test after the first year of its existence. The transition to the new
monetary regime was smooth, the monetary policy instruments have proven to be satisfactory, the new
currency is well off the ground operationally, and the expansion of the European bond market can be
seen as a first major positive impact of the euro. The open questions that remain may be teething
problems of the young baby. Nevertheless, at this stage, the market participants do not have the new
currency in their hands yet, and with the euro representing a new institutional regime, some stumbling
blocks lie along the future road. Monetary integration is a process, and some aspects of the new insti-
tutional arrangement, especially of its implementation, are not yet completely settled. To look out for
the stumbling blocks or the issues for the future means identifying the conditions for success of the
new European common currency.
In the following I distinguish stumbling blocks that are engendered by monetary policy per se, traps
that arise from the lacking preconditions in the institutional environment to the common currency as
well as from political pressure on the ECB, and finally the ultimate booby trap that may be hidden in a
conflict between the two levels of decision-making, one for monetary policy on the European level
and the other for political decision-making on the national level.
I. Potential Stumbling Blocks from Monetary Policy Per Se
1. A major issue for the euro arises if the ECB fails to establish its reputation.
The euro is a new currency, and the ECB as a new institution still has to establish its reputation. The
best way for the ECB to do this is to deliver a stable money to the market participants. It has set its
price level target at below 2 percent. This is appropriate in order to define the target of price level
stability. Especially as a new institution, the ECB did not really have the option to use a more loose
definition of price level stability. The price level relates to the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices
(HICP) in euroland. This is also appropriate.
Monetary strategy. With respect to the monetary strategy, different options have been proposed to
the ECB: inflation targeting and monetary targeting. Inflation targeting implies a forecast on what the
price level will be in two or three years, starting with a given economic situation and applying a set of
monetary policy instruments. Whereas the notion of the future price level is central to any monetary
policy strategy (because monetary policy instruments only have a lagged impact on the price level),
the credibility of an inflation targeting strategy hinges very much on the quality of the forecasting
exercise. Everybody who has some experience in forecasting knows about the difficulties of such
forecasts, which include exogenous changes in the economic environment and in expectations, and
last but not least statistical revisions of macroeconomic accounting data ex post (albeit not revisions
of price level data). Among these exogenous changes are developments in world commodity markets
and currency markets.
1 If the price level forecast is off the mark and if market participants become
aware of this, it is difficult, if not impossible, to stabilize inflationary expectations. Another difficulty
is that the forecasting procedure (which model?) may not be transparent for the public. Besides this
issue of credible external signaling, inflation targeting does not represent a mechanism by which a
central bank binds itself in its decisions internally.
Defining a core inflation rate is seen by some as a way to reduce the margin of forecast error; but this softens the role of
a central bank to deliver a stable money.Monetary targeting, i.e., steering the money supply, has the advantage of binding the hands of a
central bank internally and, at the same time, of giving an important signal to the markets. A central
bank may have to take recourse to enumerating "special factors" if it misses the target growth rate for
its monetary aggregate (as the Bundesbank did in more than half the cases in the last 25 years).
Moreover, a stable relationship between the quantity of money and the price level, i.e., a stable
money demand function, is a prerequisite for this approach. With the beginning of the new monetary
regime it was not clear whether this stable relationship existed, more specifically whether the stable
relationship that prevailed in the pre-euro era would hold for the euro as well (for the Lucas critique,
see Lucas 1976).
2
The two-pillar strategy. It is for this uncertainty of a stable money demand function in a new
monetary regime that the ECB developed its two-pillar strategy, where the first pillar relates to a
reference value of M3 and the second to a set of additional factors including the price level and fac-
tors influencing it. This strategy gives the ECB some degree of freedom in its monetary policy, and it
may very well be that such a strategy makes it easier to find a decision in the ECB Board with its
slightly diverging preferences. Then, however, the two-pillar strategy camouflages an internal weak-
ness. Unfortunately, the two-pillar strategy seems to confuse the markets because market participants
are unclear about which of the two pillars is the dominating one. Thus, the ECB will have to rethink
its strategy and move more in the direction of the monetary targeting strategy.
Communicating its monetary policy to markets and to citizens represented a problem in the first
months of the ECB's existence. The ECB has spoken with many voices, and with somewhat diverging
ones. This may reflect the new situation that besides the international audience, citizens of eleven dif-
ferent countries have to be addressed, and — which complicates the task — they have to be addressed
in different languages.
Greenspan-type reliability. In any case, a rule-based strategy in contrast to a purely discretionary or
eclectic policy is pivotal for the ECB because its president can hardly establish the same level of
reputation in a short time as a long-serving central bank chief, and even more so if his term should
only last for the first half of the official length, as agreed upon in Article 112 of the EU Treaty. The
next president will have to start anew in proving his credentials before a Greenspan-type reliability is
established.
Diverging price levels in the monetary union. Restricting the increase of the Harmonised Index of
Consumer Prices to less than 2 percent implies that in some regions of the monetary union the price
level can rise by more than 2 percent. This can be expected for the countries catching up at a growth
rate higher than the euroland average. In these countries the strong income increase stimulates the
demand for nontradables, which leads to higher price increases due to the fact that productivity in-
creases cannot sufficiently match the increase in demand (for the Balassa-Samuelson effect, see
Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964)). A higher price increase in some regions necessarily means
that in other regions prices rise at a lower rate; it also means that the region with the stronger eco-
nomic expansion attracts a relatively larger share of the increase in the nominal money supply for its
money demand.
3
A higher price increase for nontradables in countries catching up such as Spain (Table 1) need not
be a matter of concern because the real appreciation is necessary to stimulate the production of non-
tradables. It will reduce the comparative advantage of tradables; this can be considered as a normal
A technical issue is whether there was more liquidity in the euro area during the transition period, i.e., more than the
sum of liquidity of the 11 individual currencies (OECD 1999).
It is a fascinating question to describe the euro zone by a set of regional (country-specific) money demand equations and
to analyze to what extent M3 increases at different rates in the regions of euroland. Statistically, this information might
be obtained from data that are used to calculate the aggregated increase of M3 in the monetary union. The common
short-term interest rate can not reduce the higher money demand in strongly growing regions; in addition, the higher
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process. This argument, however, does not hold for Ireland because its per capita GDP is higher than
the EU-11 average (forecast for 2000: 115.9 percent, as shown in Bjorksten and Syrjanen 1999). It is
also a different matter when the price level rises relatively faster in a country whose growth rate is
lower than the EU-11 average. Thus, Italy tends to have a price increase roughly half a percentage
point higher than the EU-11 average, and this in spite of a relatively low growth rate of 1.5 percent
(1999) (and a lower per capita GDP than the average). If such a tendency becomes more pronounced,
a country loses competitiveness for its tradables, and stagflation may lead to higher unemployment.
2. The low external value of the euro raises the risk that the market participants lose confidence
in the new European currency.
Only one nominal anchor. A central bank cannot have two nominal anchors for its currency, both the
internal price level and the external value of a currency. This can be seen immediately from
w = p (M) — p* (M*), where w is the rate of change in the exchange rate of two countries, p and
p * are the rates of change in their national price levels, and M and M * are the rates of change in
their money supplies (a star denotes the foreign country). If the exchange rate is chosen as the nomi-
nal anchor, one of the national central banks must adjust the money supply such that the internal price
level follows the price level in the foreign country. It is no longer free to choose its own price level.
Whereas this strategy may be followed by smaller countries taken in tow by a stability-oriented larger
country, the ECB cannot really apply this strategy. It would follow the Fed automatically step by step,
and euroland would merely be a Fed district. Therefore, the internal price level must be chosen as the
nominal anchor by the ECB. This implies that, according to purchasing power parity, the exchange
rate will be the result of monetary policy.
Effects of depreciation on the price level. Things are more complicated when a marked depreciation
of a currency occurs. In its first 14 months, the euro lost 12.7 percent of its initial external value rela-
tive to the US dollar (January 1999-January 2000; Figure I).
4 Such a change in the external value
will have an effect on the internal price level so that both variables are not completely separated.
One effect is that import prices rise if a currency is devalued; this is a once-and-for-all effect on the
price level. The other is that the public audience may take a low external value as being a sign of a
weak currency in general. Then, a low external value may translate into inflationary expectations or
The real effective exchange rate fell by 12.4 percent.Figure 1: The US$/Euro Exchange Rate (Monthly averages)
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Quelle: Datastream.
expectations on further depreciations. These effects cannot be neglected by the ECB. Therefore, it has
to factor in the effects of depreciation on the future price level in its monetary policy decisions.
This reasoning implies a hypothesis on the impact of exchange rate changes on the price level and
some notion on the type of exchange rate variation to be expected, especially on exchange rate expec-
tations. Changes in expectations depend on many factors, one of them being the future strength or
weakness of the economies of the currency area . They are also influenced by other aspects of stability
policy such as the fiscal policy stance or wage policy. Thus, exchange rate expectations are not de-
termined by the ECB alone; they are also influenced by other players in the wider field of economic
policy.
II. Stumbling Blocks with Respect to Preconditions for the Monetary Union and
Political Pressure on the ECB
Some issues may arise in the future because the economic environment may hinder the ECB in fulfill-
ing its task. Among these issues is a technical one, namely to what extent the existing form of finan-
cial supervision in euroland is sufficient. More important issues are the risk of free riding of national
governments, the failure of national governments to establish the necessary institutional setting for the
common currency, the attempt of national interest groups to influence this setting in their favor, and
the risk that new members will add to the heterogeneity of the monetary union and thus make the task
of the ECB more difficult.3. Financial supervision is a precondition for shielding the European Central Bank against
potential problems of financial instability.
A major question is whether the euro as a common currency can get along with a banking supervision
that is basically organized nationally or whether a unified system of financial supervision for Europe
will eventually be required.
The task of financial supervision is to ensure the stability of the financial sector, more specifically,
to prevent runs on a bank and a contagion of the financial system as a whole when a bank or a group
of banks gets into trouble. The ultimate target of financial supervision is to rule out that the ECB has
to step in as a lender of last resort. Two issues have to be solved: First, should financial supervision
be separated from the central bank? In principle, it makes sense to separate the money-steering
process from the supervision of the financial industry, i.e., to organize these two functions in different
institutions. A conflict of interest is prevented. Above all, the central bank should not be influenced
by looking at financial stability when determining monetary policy (Lannoo 1999). This does not
mean that an intensive exchange of information is not necessary between the supervising authority
and the central bank. For practical reasons, however, it may also be feasible to entrust the ECB with
the supervision task, since the ECB has already been established as a European institution and a new
supervising authority would not have to be established.
The second issue is to what extent financial supervision has to be europeanized. There are some
arguments in favor of national supervision. One is the high degree of decentralized information which
is a necessary ingredient of financial supervision. Moreover, some safety nets such as deposit insur-
ances for the savings and loan associations or for the private banks are established nationally, and
they represent important firewalls when a crisis breaks out. However, financial supervision in the
monetary union is different from that in the pre-euro era. Now, a national run on a bank cannot easily
be separated from the common currency. In addition, financial institutions will merge nationally and
across borders; this means that the risk of a run increases for the currency area as a whole once a
crisis breaks out, even if it is national. Moreover, a purely national supervision based on the home
country control rule may get into moral hazard problems in playing down the risk of national prob-
lems since part of the impact of national failure will be borne by the currency union as a whole. Con-
sequently, banking supervision in a currency union cannot be split up into a system of national super-
vising bodies as if the currency union had not been established. As a solution, a strong coordination
of national supervision with firm procedures is mandatory; this involves a clearly delineated assign-
ment of responsibilities with indisputable criteria for national authorities. Supervising transnational
banks in euroland is a specific issue and will require to develop common criteria (Aglietta et al. 1998,
OECD 1999, Padoa-Schioppa 1999).
4. Member countries of the common currency area may free ride on the common currency.
A Minhas Gerais problem in EMU? In the pre-euro system, countries could not really deviate strongly
from a path of stability policy. When they did, they were subject to an implicit interplay of interest
rate parity and purchasing power parity, in which interest rate parity determined capital flows and
purchasing power parity formed the expectations on price level changes (Siebert 1999a). When a
country deviated from the stability path, interest rates rose and, in the worst case, the country's cur-
rency depreciated. Governments were thus induced to prevent these effects. In the new system of the
euro, member countries can in principle free ride on a stable euro by not following a stability path in
their economic policy. Thus, if a member country increases its public debt, it may have to pay a
somewhat higher interest rate but it may be able to shift part of the burden of its policy to the other
member countries, for instance, by weakening the external value of the common currency and thus re-
quiring a risk premium for all euro members. To put it to the extreme, the issue is whether a Minhas
Gerais problem can arise in the European Monetary Union: In January 1999, Itamar Franco, the gov-ernor of Minhas Gerais, announced a 90-day moratorium on interest payment and redemption of pub-
lic debt, and this precipitated the currency crisis of the Brazilian real.
Stability pact: Preventing expectations on depreciation. According to Article 103 of the European
Treaty, the Community shall not be liable to assume the commitments of national governments; this
also holds for the member states (no-bailout clause). In principle, neither the EU nor the other
member countries will step in if a member country runs into a financial crisis.
5 The issue is whether
everyone will credibly stick to the no-bailout clause. In any case, it is prudent to prevent such a worst
case scenario. Even the risk of such a scenario weakens the common currency. To reduce the risk of
weakening the common currency by national free riding is sufficient reason for sticking to the stabil-
ity pact.
6
Stability pact: Preventing political pressure. Another reason is to shield the ECB against political
pressure which arises if countries face severe economic problems. This holds particularly for coun-
tries with high indebtedness where political maneuvering space in the future is restricted by a high
interest burden. Such countries may be interested in low interest rates, a rather lax monetary policy,
and a (slightly) higher inflation rate than the one anticipated by financial markets because all this
would ease their budgetary situation, especially as debts would melt away in real terms.
Central banks are always under political pressure. Of course, one could assume that the ECB is
completely immune to such political pressure and administers monetary policy like a robot not influ-
enced at all by political demands. For instance, in the case of monetary targeting, the ECB would steer
the money supply automatically like a machine, expanding the aggregate money supply according to
the growth rate of the production potential. Similarly, in the case of inflation targeting, it would stick
to its preannounced target. In neither case would it take into account the business cycle nor the elec-
tion schedules in individual countries nor any other economic or political variable. Then, no one
would need to shield such a robot against political pressure. But this approach would be naive. The
ECB does not operate in an institutional vacuum. Therefore, it is necessary to fend off political pres-
sure put on the ECB. The criterion of the sustainability of national public budgets is well suited to
shield the central bank from political pressure within the monetary union. Such a constraint on the fis-
cal policy of member countries becomes especially necessary if countries have institutional arrange-
ments which are not inducive to solid governmental finances. A case in point is the weakness in




5 Article 100 Sec. 2, however, suggests another interpretation.
" Note that the stability pact refers to public spending only. The more basic problem is that the depreciation of the euro
may be a reflection of the balance of payments situation of euroland. In the monetary union, the balance of payments is
still valid as a national budget restraint. An individual country may have a large deficit in the current account, and this
deficit may influence the overall balance of payments of euroland and the exogenous value of the exchange rate. There is
no mechanism in the EU Treaty addressing this problem except for the case that absorption of a national government is
too high relative to its tax revenue.
7 One may argue that the reductions in the budget deficits of the EU-11 countries prove that budget policies have changed,
possibly due to the stability pact. Note, however, that this may only be an episode in an upswing.
8 The general rule is that a budget deficit surpassing three percent of GDP is considered excessive. This only holds if GDP
falls by less than 0.75 percent. In other cases, there are exceptions: A real decrease of GDP on a yearly basis of at least 2
percent is viewed without any further argument as an exception. In the intermediate range between 0.75 and 2 percent, a
set of discretionary decisions of the ECOFIN council will have to be made. Whether an excessive budget deficit exists is
unclear if a member state, after being put into delay by a formal resolution, indeed takes appropriate measures. Whether
the measures taken are appropriate is decided by the ECOFIN council. Initially, only a non-interest-bearing deposit is
required. This will be converted into a fine after two years if the budget deficit remains excessive. These discretionary
steps raise the question whether the stability pact will be effective. Moreover, there is a conflict of roles, since those who
are responsible for the excessive budgetary deficit will also be the ones to define it. In sum, self-confinement of the
countries to a quasi automatism has only been reached in the case in which GDP declines by less than 0.75 percent. Pro-
posals have failed according to which a budgetary deficit would be confirmed automatically, for instance, if the deficit
surpasses 3 percent of GDP.Restraint versus coordination. The issue of introducing a constraint on national budget policy is not
identical to the issue of coordinating national stability policies, that is fiscal policy (within the limits
of the stability pact) and wage policy. Coordination refers to the problem whether and how macro-
economic policies of various nations should be brought in line with each other and to what extent the
optimal macroeconomic policy mix between europeanized monetary policy on the one hand and na-
tional fiscal and wage policy on the other hand should change in the currency union.
According to textbooks, in a currency union fiscal policy should gain a more important role in
stabilizing the economy over the business cycle.
9 However, experience does not suggest that fiscal
policy has been able to satisfy this role. Rarely has fiscal policy been used to squeeze excessive ag-
gregate demand in order to dampen the boom. Rarely has the political process been capable of balanc-
ing the budget over the business cycle: the stimulation of demand in recessions has usually been as-
sociated with public debt that ratchets upward over time. Thus, heroic rational behavior of politicians
in the European Monetary Union would be required if fiscal policy were to play a role in stabilizing
national economies over the business cycle. The politician who undertakes restrictive fiscal policy in
a boom when tax revenues are spouting has been compared to a pug dog guarding a pile of sausages.
For an anticyclical fiscal policy, the vegetarian pug has yet to be bred.
In practice, fiscal policy often has been volatile due to the political economy of expenditure and
taxation and due to time inconsistency; the volatility of public expenditure has itself generated a cycle
or aggravated a cycle. Such a stop-and-go policy or an ad hoc approach needs to be prevented in the
monetary union. Steadiness of fiscal policy is required in order to smooth aggregate demand and ex-
pectations of the private sector. Moreover, each country will have to increase its efforts to improve
the elasticity of its supply side so that fluctuations in GDP and employment can be reduced.
1
0
The prescriptions for fiscal policy given here seem to be asymmetric. On the one hand, national fis-
cal policy may have to play a larger role in stabilizing national economies if one follows Keynesian
lines; on the other hand, it has to have its hands tied in order to prevent political pressure from weak-
ening monetary stability. This is not a contradiction. The overriding prescription is to prevent political
pressure on the central bank: in no case should the stabilization role of fiscal policy lead to debt levels
that would jeopardize price level stability. Keynesian-type stabilization, as doubtful as it may be any-
how, can only take place within the limits of the stability pact.
Worldwide locational competition as a constraint. An effective constraint on national budget and
tax policies may come about by locational competition on a global scale. Countries compete for the
mobile factors of production, i.e., for the mobile capital, for the mobile technical knowledge, and for
the mobile highly qualified workers, with their public goods such as infrastructure and with their
taxes (Siebert 2000b). This phenomenon forces countries to lower taxes (on mobile factors of produc-
tion) and reduce government spending. This also implies a consolidation of public budgets and
smaller budget deficits. Witness the shift in orientation of Germany's fiscal policy in 1999.
5. The political environment will put pressure on the ECB to give more weight to goals other
than price level stability.
The trade-off between price level stability and other goals such as employment has always been a
major point of discussion in monetary politics. If a short-run Phillips curve is assumed to hold, un-
employment can be reduced under the condition that an increase in the price level is accepted. It
An institutional setup that relies more on flexible exchange rates reduces the role of fiscal policy; one that relies more on
fixed exchange rates gives fiscal policy a larger role (Siebert 2000a, Ch. 16).
In this context, asynchronic business cycle situations between countries add, at least theoretically, a new dimension to
wage policy in a monetary union. Wage policy must help to tone down demand pressure in a boom; at least wage policy
should not break the boom by demanding excessive wages. In a recession, wage policy has to assist in bringing about an
upswing, i.e., it must take into account the low (often negative) productivity growth in a recession in order to allow more
employment to come about. More flexible wages, including a profit-related element, can help to make jobs more stable
over the business cycle.10
would, however, be a mistake to succumb to the fallacy of the short-run Phillips curve between the
rate of inflation and unemployment. Economic agents with rational expectations would anticipate the
higher inflation rate and require higher nominal interest rates, higher prices, and higher wages. The
value of money would deteriorate and the European Central Bank would quickly lose its reputation.
Eventually, the European Central Bank would be forced to put on the brakes, and a "stabilization re-
cession" would be the result. Then, severe costs of disinflation would arise. In the long run, the
Phillips curve is vertical anyhow.
1
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Some people demand a more active role of monetary policy for smoothening the business cycle.
They claim that especially in a recession monetary policy should reduce the interest rate in order to
get out of the recession. It should be noted that in a recession transaction demand for money falls, and
consequently the interest rate will be lower anyway. Explicitly reducing the interest rate in a recession
in order to stimulate economic activities engenders the risk that monetary policy becomes unsteady,
that market participants lose confidence, and that expectations become unstable. This raises the risk
that monetary policy will itself initiate a cycle or aggravate a cycle. Quite to the contrary, monetary
policy should stabilize expectations over the cycle and steer the money aggregate in such a way that
the cycle is not aggravated. Very often people forget that it is only with a time lag that monetary pol-
icy impacts on economic activity and the price level. Unfortunately, the time lags of the money supply
with respect to investment and with respect to the price level are quite different; it tended to be 3-4
quarters in Germany in the past with respect to investment, whereas the time lag with respect to the
price level was 10 quarters.
Some people in the political arena also demand that monetary policy should stimulate economic
growth, thus bringing the economy on a higher growth path. Reference is made to the "new economy"
in the United States and Greenspan's approach to the money supply. This demand suggests that
growth can be stimulated by an increase in the money supply, a misleading idea. The relationship is
the other way around: If an economy experiences a strong expansion of its production potential and if
there is a high elasticity on the supply side, the money supply can increase faster than if an economy
only has a low rate of expansion of the production capacity. Thus, it is the task of politics to make the
economies of euroland more flexible in a first step; this is a precondition for the "new economy" to
happen. In a second step, money supply can increase at a higher rate without causing inflation.
The political demand for accountancy
1
2 of the ECB is blurred with these issues which in essence
relate to the weights to be given to economic policy goals other than price level stability. Of course,
things are much easier for politicians in the short run if the monetary authority does not put too much
weight on price level stability. In the long run, however, there are high opportunity costs of an un-
stable money. "It is important that area-wide political bodies, like the European Parliament, ECOFIN
... or informal meetings ... do not become vehicles for ... pressures" (OECD 1999: 70).
Institutionally, the issue which weight should be given to different targets is solved by the assign-
ment of responsibilities. The assignment principle states that a policy maker should be responsible for
the target for which he has been assigned the corresponding policy instrument. According to this ap-
proach, fiscal policy is responsible for providing public goods, the social partners who set the wages
are responsible for employment and unemployment, and the monetary authority is responsible for a
stable money. In game-theoretic models it can be shown that under a set of conditions cooperation
towards an optimal policy mix can improve welfare, but blurring the assignment of instruments and
responsibilities in practice may very well lead away from a desirable attainment of policy targets.
1
1 It should also not be forgotten that even if monetary policy were to stimulate GDP in the short run, this would not trans-
form into employment in the European context in a one-to-one relation because of the "employment threshold" (Siebert
1998a).
1
2 Transparency is a different matter (see Buiter 1999 and Issing 1999). There are some good reasons why too much trans-
parency may not be instrumental in strengthening the reputation of the ECB (OECD 1999: 79).11
6. National economic policies have severe difficulties in establishing the necessary institutional
conditions in the national labor markets for a smooth functioning of the common currency.
In the literature on common currency areas, the economic conditions for a successful monetary union
have been discussed intensively. These arise from the fact that in a monetary union exchange rate (and
interest rate) adjustments can no longer be used as an equilibrating measure if economic develop-
ments between countries diverge. Economic developments may diverge between the countries of a
currency union when a shock affects countries asymmetrically and when the business cycles in the
European Union are out of synchronization and a country is in recession whereas others are not. Prior
to the monetary union, the country could have devalued its currency to regain competitiveness. Within
a monetary union, a member country fully experiences the asymmetric shock: In the case of a negative
disturbance, production falls, the utilization of the production potential decreases, and unemployment
rises. The economy has to adjust by using mechanisms other than the exchange rate and the interest
rate (Siebert 1998b, Dohse and Krieger-Boden 1998). Moreover, exchange rate changes can no longer
be used when growth in some countries is weaker than in others, when home-made problems evolve
in some countries, or when some countries respond more flexibly to a shock that is symmetric to the
European Union as a whole.
How relevant is heterogeneity? How relevant diverging economic developments between the
countries of the monetary union will be depends on a number of conditions. For instance, economic
structures may differ so that external shocks have a different impact on the member countries. Em-
pirical studies indicate that in the past there was much homogeneity among some European countries
(especially Germany, Austria, Benelux, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, France) in the sense that
these countries experienced shocks that were correlated to each other, which means there was interde-
pendence between them (albeit to a smaller degree than between the regions of a country, for instance
Germany; see Funke 1997). Contemporaneous correlations increased in the nineties relative to the
eighties; they were also strong in the seventies due to the (symmetric) oil price shocks (Sachverstan-
digenrat 1998: Figure 30). Angeloni and Dedola (1999) find that in the most recent period correlations
of output, stock market indices, and prices have increased in euroland. But there is heterogeneity for a
larger group of countries, which means weaker linkages. For instance, shocks in the United Kingdom
showed a stronger correlation with shocks in North America in the past than with continental Euro-
pean countries.
It is an open question whether a common currency area will lead to greater specialization in space
(Krugman 1993) or whether the economic structure will become more homogenous. The example of
the United States suggests that spatial differentiation can play an important role in a large geographi-
cal area. Moreover, there was 0- and a-convergence in per capita output for a longer period of time,
for instance for the last four decades (Sachverstandigenrat 1998: Figure 31) or for the period 1980-
1995 (Siebert 1999a: Figure 4.12), but there was a-divergence between the mid-seventies and the
mid-eighties, and there was quite a variance of growth rates in 1997-1999 (Bjorksten and Syrjanen
1999). Thus, it is open whether the fundamentals of economic growth differ between countries.
Substitutes for the exchange rate. A cascade of equilibrating mechanisms exists which can be used
to replace an exchange rate and interest rate adjustment (Mundell 1961). First, the migration of labor
can take the place of a devaluation of the home currency. If workers leave a country which has been
struck by a crisis and move to more prospering countries, unemployment decreases in the crisis area.
The per capita income of the country in question will rise again. However, under European condi-
tions, language barriers and cultural diversity will limit the mobility of people. Moreover, this is a
"passive" cure. In addition, this form of adjustment will not be accepted by the countries to which12
workers would have to emigrate. The willingness to absorb workers from abroad is low.
1
3 Even
though the free movement of labor is one of the four freedoms of the Common Market, it seems real-
istic that, unlike the United States (Blanchard and Katz 1992), labor migration will play a minor role
as an equilibrating instrument in the divergent structural development in Europe.
1
4
Capital mobility cannot replace labor mobility as an equilibrating mechanism in the case of re-
gional crises. Consider the case of a region with a negative asymmetric shock. If capital instead of la-
bor leaves a shock-ridden region, the pressure on wages is even higher. Thus, the outflow of capital is
not an equilibrating factor. If capital moves to the regions with the higher rate of return, capital mo-
bility is a mechanism that accentuates divergence and increases locational competition.
1
5
Second, if labor migration is ruled out as a substitute to exchange rate adjustment, relative prices
will have to do the job. In the case of a negative shock, a real depreciation improves competitiveness.
This means that the relative price of nontradables must fall in order to stimulate the production of
tradables. In bringing about this change in relative prices, wages as the price of the most important
immobile production factor will have to bear most of the burden of adjustment. Under the conditions
of a growing economy, wages in a problem area cannot rise as much as under normal conditions.
1
6
Third, if wages do not react flexibly, differences in unemployment between the countries of the
currency union are likely to develop. Then, financial transfers are a candidate that can take over the
shock-absorbing role of a devaluation.
Institutional reforms of the labor market. If an increase in transfers is to be prevented, wages have
to be highly flexible, and they have to be differentiated in the economic space of the monetary
union.
1
7 The political task is to make national labor markets more flexible in order to avoid additional
unemployment and to reduce existing unemployment. This prerequisite is not satisfied in most of the
continental European countries, especially not in Germany and France.
Many people hope that the monetary union as a new institutional regime will be a catalyst to en-
force an institutional reform of Europe's labor markets. This impact has not yet been seen, and the
national governments of the major continental European economies have not initiated any significant
change in the national labor markets as required by the monetary union. Quite to the contrary, the dis-
cussion on retirement at the age of 60 and legal changes in Germany (Sachverstandigenrat 1999) as
well as the mandatory reduction of working hours in France go into the wrong direction.
7. Interest groups in the member countries will defend their political position and will resist
necessary institutional changes in the labor market.
Interest groups in the currency area will attempt to influence politics in the monetary union in their
favor. They will attempt to prevent the necessary institutional changes. Thus, trade unions will push
for centralizing wage bargaining on a European level. This is in their interest because a joint wage
policy and a joint influence on public opinion would strengthen their organizational power and their
political position.
1
3 Evidence for this is given by the German discussion on the "Entsendegesetz;" this is an attempt to keep foreign EU
workers out of some segments of the German labor market by making minimum wages mandatory in the construction
industry.
1
4 Compare Decressin and Fatas (1995) who apply the Blanchard-Katz (1992) approach to Europe. Note that spatial mo-
bility of labor, as far as it exists in Europe, is a phenomenon between regions of a nation and not so much a phenomenon
between nations.
1
5 Capital mobility can, however, speed up the convergence process.
1
6 The reduced increase in wages does not stimulate the economy in the same way as a devaluation would: a devaluation
re-establishes competitiveness for all tradables, a change in wages favors labor-intensive production and thus re-estab-
lishes the competitiveness of jobs.
1
7 The necessary adjustment is not only a matter of the flexibility of nominal or real wages. Existing restrictions on the
employment of labor are implicit labor costs. Formally, such restrictions represent negative shadow prices of labor to
firms and reduce their demand for labor. The labor markets in Europe are marked by such restrictions which cause high
unemployment to a significant extent (Siebert 1997).13
Europeanizing wage policy? Europeanizing wage formation is, however, a complete contradiction
to the requirement of decentralization. It runs counter to what is needed to reduce unemployment in a
currency union. It implies that the necessary decentralization of wage formation is prevented and that,




tend to rise and political pressure to use monetary policy for solving the unemployment problem will
tend to increase. Of course, if the ECB ignores these pressures, there is no problem. However, it may
be more difficult for the ECB to raise its voice in a public chorus if wage policy is transfered to the
European level.
Europeanizing employment policy? The employment chapter added to the EU Treaty at the
Amsterdam Summit engenders the risk that governmental employment policies will be europeanized.
Such an approach would suggest that the problem of unemployment can be solved on a European
level, for instance by an employment program or an employment pact. Such an approach would blur
the responsibilities and allow trade unions to shift part of their responsibility for employment and un-
employment to politics and to the European level. The EU can be used as a scapegoat; this may end
up as a severe damage to the European cause. Shifting unemployment policies to the European level
may increase pressure on the ECB to follow an easy money policy and may make it more difficult for
the ECB to convince the public of its policy. Europeanizing employment policy is as serious a mis-
judgment as europeanizing wage policy. In the EU, the unemployment rates differ considerably be-
tween countries. This suggests that the differentiation of national approaches to the labor market has
been successful. Therefore, employment should remain a national responsibility.
2
0
A lax monetary policy as a substitute for transfers. Transfers will have to replace the exchange rate
adjustment mechanism when labor is not sufficiently mobile and when wages are not sufficiently di-
vergent between countries. Transfers may also increase the pressure on the ECB: If transfers have to
be made in the end — in spite of liability being excluded — the donor of transfers may develop an
interest to keep these transfers as low as possible, replacing them by a rather lax monetary policy.
2
1
8. In attracting new members, care must be taken not to increase the heterogeneity of the
monetary union.
Economic heterogeneity is a problem for a monetary union. If economic structures and processes are
too divergent between the member countries it is difficult to explain the common monetary policy to
1
8 Some countries have strengthened the bargaining partners, i.e., trade unions and employers' associations, and the wage
cartel by passing laws that, for instance, extend wage-bargaining results from one region to another region, that make
wage negotiation results binding per se, or that make them binding pursuant to other laws which rule out exemptions
even in the case of economic crisis. Supporting wage cartels in this manner should not be introduced on the European
level.
1
9 Labor costs also include the costs of social security, which are politically determined. In some countries, these costs —
the second wage — amount to nearly the level of regular wages; Germany is an example. Countries can keep their jobs
competitive if they have a social security system which is more efficient, for instance, because it is shaped differently for
historical reasons or because it is less complete. A harmonization of the social security systems in Europe would run
counter to the differentiation of labor costs and would raise unemployment. In any case, these systems are now organ-
ized nationally in Europe; payments are only provided by the social security system to which the recipient has made his
contribution (principle of territory). One realistically has to assume that a European social security system stretching
from Portugal to Sweden is not feasible. Therefore, no attempt should be made to set up such a system. In a way, the
monetary union and the social union are at odds. In any case, it is more difficult to establish a social union in a monetary
union. Converging levels of social security can only result in the very long run — in a historical perspective.
2
0 What can be done on a European level is to strengthen national governments against vested interest groups in the indi-
vidual countries which prevent the necessary institutional changes.
2
1 Whereas a transfer mechanism may be acceptable in a political union it is hardly conceivable among still sovereign na-
tion-states. Thus, since the European Monetary Union will not be accompanied by a political union, the willingness to
agree on transfers should be lower than it is in the nation-states. The EU lacks an important condition in order to assign
the right to tax to a central level, namely democratic legitimization (no taxation without representation). It is for good
reasons that an increase in the budget of the European Commission is restrained, since decisions on tax policy have to be
passed unanimously.14
the public audience. Heterogeneity relates to such issues as differences in price level increases, in the
national business cycles and growth, in specialization in space and in unemployment.
2
2
Heterogeneity also refers to new members. In principle, new members may add to the heterogeneity
of the monetary union. Whereas an enlarged monetary union, i.e., size, makes the euro more attractive
as an international currency (size effect), heterogeneity per se weakens the monetary union and its
currency (heterogeneity effect). An important condition is that new members enter at an exchange
rate that is not distorted. If the entrant's currency is overvalued, the new member experiences a real
appreciation which will hurt its exports and economic activity in general. The country then will have
to adjust to the real appreciation over time, for instance by reducing costs, including labor costs. Ex-
amples of a wrong exchange rate when entering a monetary union or some type of fixed exchange rate
system are Eastern Germany and the German monetary union as well as Great Britain re-entering the
gold standard in 1925 and the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1990. If a currency were undervalued, the
economy of a country would be artificially stimulated, implying distortions to the other members of
the monetary union.
It is therefore necessary to apply the condition of Article 121 of the EU Treaty that the normal
(narrow) margins provided for by the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System are
to be observed for a period of two years prior to entry without devaluation. If this condition is vio-
lated, the country should not join. The condition is necessary in order to make sure that the country in
question fits into the monetary union. The condition is also necessary in order to reduce the damage to
the club that a new member could cause. Unfortunately, the condition being fulfilled does not imply
that an overvaluation of the currency may not exist when the country enters. This becomes apparent
with respect to the United Kingdom.
In the case of the United Kingdom, one may have to wait until the weakness of the euro and the
strength of the pound are more in line. Figure 2 illustrates the narrow band for the British pound for a
two-year period. Taking the nineties as a frame of reference the choice of an entry rate seems to repre-
sent a severe problem if too high an entry rate is to be avoided. One way to reach a less distorted rate
is that the countries of euroland revamp their national labor markets so that euroland introduces more
flexibility in its economies and the euro appreciates relative to the pound. The other way is to wait for
a period in which the business cycles and the interest rates are much more synchronized.
In the case of candidates for EU membership, transition countries like the Czech Republic, Poland,
and Hungary are likely to face severe structural changes in their catching-up processes, and the nomi-
nal exchange rate will be needed as an adjustment mechanism (Siebert 1999a). It would therefore be
unwise to include these countries in the monetary union early on.
2
2 Differences in the transmission of monetary policy between countries are likely to whither away over time.15
Figure 2: The Euro, the British Pound, and the Entry Rate




The Major Stumbling Block — The Conflict between the Common Monetary
Policy and the National Interest
The real test for the euro will be the conflict between national political decision-making and
the europeanized monetary policy in the case of a major national economic crisis.
Institutional arrangements must be storm-proof and must hold in situations of severe conflict. A
potential for conflict in the European Monetary Union exists between a europeanized monetary policy
and national economic interests. Monetary policy affects all member countries in the same way, but it
is still judged in national political decision-making processes. A political union with communal deci-
sion-making and communal preference mechanisms has not come into existence simultaneously with
a monetary union. Consequently, one has to take into account the possibility that an asymmetry be-
tween the more or less uniform incidence of a common monetary policy and the political evaluation of
monetary policy by national decision-making might arise.
The worst case in terms of such a conflict that can be envisioned for the new monetary arrangement
is when there is a fundamentally bad economic situation in one country while the economic situation
in the rest of euroland is good. An ingredient of such a scenario would be a major national crisis, for
instance, a home-made crisis due to severe policy failure, e.g., a time of social unrest with people
protesting in the streets. A further ingredient of such a severe-crisis scenario would be that it is a ma-
jor member country of the monetary union that is in trouble. If this happened in a situation in which
the ECB would have to raise the interest rate in order to maintain price level stability, a clash between
the national interest in one country and common monetary policy will result. Another less severe case
could be a scenario in which one country's economic competitiveness deteriorates persistently over
time, while other countries gain in competitiveness. An appreciating euro would then hurt the country
in trouble.
It can be argued that a worst-case scenario will be less likely in the future. First, it can be hypothe-
sized that the business cycles will be more uniform in the member countries, because at least one16
policy instrument that is related to the business cycle is harmonized, namely, the short-term interest
rate (as well as the long-term rate due to a single capital market with still some segmentation). The
counter argument is that a greater specialization in space may occur and that this would imply a
greater vulnerability of specific regions of the euro zone. Second, it can be argued that the stability
pact will do its job and, even if it does not function perfectly, will prevent the worst case from hap-
pening.
Besides the worst case, there is a more or less permanent potential for political conflict.
2
3 Feldstein
(2000) makes the point that the intensity of conflict may increase because the necessary institutional
arrangements are likely not to be made. Thus diverging high unemployment rates and intra-euroland
redistribution, financed by taxes of the member states, may be bones of contention in euroland; these
issues could be used by national populist movements.
In looking at this potential for conflict, we may take comfort in Dornbusch's (2000: 33) assertion:
"Only the most extravagant mind can imagine that in Europe politics gets to hijack the central bank."
After all, the ECB has won the first round with politics when Lafontaine, Germany's former minister
of finance, stepped down. This, however, was more a conflict over the priorities of the monetary
authority vis-a-vis politics or a conflict over the relevant economic paradigm. I would like to call this
a "type-1 conflict." The ECB is pressured to include other targets such as unemployment. In contrast,
the "type-2 conflict" is a clash between the European and the national level.
In any case, the conflict over the weights of other policy targets than price level stability may
intensify in the future. Moreover, the test was made easier so far because the euro started under favor-
able conditions: The business cycle is on the upswing and unemployment is falling, mainly for cycli-
cal reasons and because of a reduced labor force. The political environment for the ECB may be less
favorable if this fair weather is over, with more of "type-1 conflict." But what is more important for
the European Monetary Union is that we cannot completely rule out a major crisis in a major member
country, the worst-case scenario, that is a "type-2 conflict." Thus, the major test for the ECB is still to
come.
What is the answer to this policy problem? Besides the economic preconditions for a currency
union, the political condition sine qua non is some political homogeneity in the sense that the com-
mon monetary policy must be accepted by the member states. Historically, multinational currency
unions (in contrast to national currency unions) have depended on the political will to support them.
They broke up (Bordo and Jonung 1999, Fidrmuc et al. 1999) when the political will ceased to be
sufficiently strong. EMU requires quite an amount of discipline on the part of national policymakers.
Having a common currency, politicians in the member states must be prepared to accept two things.
First, an independent European Central Bank has been entrusted with the authority to steer the money
supply, i.e., to set the interest rates and determine other monetary policy instruments. Monetary affairs
have been taken out of the hands of politics altogether, i.e., the process of money creation has been
depoliticized. This relates to the "type-1 conflict " problem. Second, the money supply process has
been handed over to a common institution on the European level, i.e., money has been denationalized.
This relates to the "type-2 conflict" problem.
Unfortunately, the contractual arrangement of the euro cannot specify all future states of nature. A
monetary union is an evolutionary process where not all possible developments are known yet. Thus,
the European Monetary Union should be accompanied by a "policy learning process, where policy
makers learn to cope with the shortcomings that emerge" (Bordo and Jonung 1999: 33).
The answer that politicians have to accept the depolitization and the denationalization of the money
supply process appeals to the goodwill of all participants. This may be a weak solution for a new
monetary regime; the euro can only get a strong foundation if the states are sufficiently prepared to
In this context, the issue to what extent monetary policy may have different regional impacts due to differences in the
transmission mechanism can be viewed as a technical problem (OECD 1999).17
support the common monetary policy. This can be accomplished if the European interest gains more
weight in the objective functions of national political decisionmakers than the national interests and if
the voter starts to think more in European than in national terms.
If such sentences are not to remain shallow and are to have some substance, one has to think of
mechanisms which make sure that relying on goodwill is not the only approach to solve potential
conflicts. One way out is to change the democratic setup of political decision-making by giving more
weight to European aspects. This change raises severe questions which relate to the political concept
for Europe and its federal structure, to the issue of a European constitution, and to the very basic
question whether a European sovereign — a European people — is beginning to exist. Another ap-
proach is to create a European audience for the ECB's policy as well as for economic policy issues in
general. For one, this is the task of the ECB itself to establish its audience and to build up its reputa-
tion in the European population so that individuals and markets are prepared to support the ECB's
cause against politics and that nationals are willing to support the European cause (in monetary pol-
icy) against their own national interests. But the creation of a European audience is not a matter of the
ECB alone. It must come about by the European press looking beyond the national fence. It must also
be brought about by academia. The European institutions can help in organizing joint research and,
for instance, joint business cycle outlooks in analogy to the joint reports that have been prepared for
decades by five major economic research institutes in Germany.
A proposal that I would like to put forward is to establish a European Council of Economic
Advisers (Wise Men). Under European conditions, the US example of a council being part of gov-
ernment is not appropriate. Therefore, the analogy to the German Council of Economic Advisers
seems to be more fitting. The council should be independent and present its annual report to the
European parliament where it should be discussed. The report should focus the economic policy de-
bate in the European Monetary Union. The topics to be covered would thus be the problems of euro-
land, including future topics, like its enlargement. Such a report could contain a business cycle out-
look for the world economy, for Europe, and for the individual countries and address the major policy
issues. In order to keep such a council manageable, it should consist of five to seven members pref-
erably not chosen on a country principle but in a fashion similar to that of the members of the Board
of the ECB.
2
4 The main function of the European Economic Council would be to establish a Euro-
pean audience for monetary and economic policy.
2
4 An alternative would be to have rotating members with respect to countries, possibly with permanent members for some
countries.18
References
Aglietta, M., L. Scialom, and T. Sessin (1998). Prudential Supervision Reforms in Europe. Arguments and Pro-
posals. Research Papers in Banking and Finance 98/10. Institute of European Finance, Bangor.
Angeloni, I., and L. Dedola (1999). From the Erm to the Euro: New Evidence on Economic and Policy Conver-
gence among EU Countries. Working Paper 4. European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main.
Balassa, B.A. (1964). The Purchasing Power Parity Doctrine: A Reappraisal. Journal of Political Economy 72:
584-596.
Barro,.R., and D. Gordon (1983). Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy. Journal of
Monetary Economics 12: 101-121.
Bayoumi, T., and P.R. Masson (1995). Fiscal Flows in the United States and Canada: Lessons for Monetary Un-
ion in Europe. European Economic Review 39 (2): 253-2"/'4.
Bayoumi, T., and B.J. Eichengreen (1995). Restraining Yourself: The Implications of Fiscal Rules for Economic
Stabilization. IMF Staff Papers 42 (1): 32^48.
Bjbrkste'n, N., and M. Syrjanen (1999). Divergences in the Euro Area: a Cause for Concern? Bank of Finland
Discussion Papers 11/99. Helsinki.
Blanchard, O.J., and L.F. Katz (1992). Regional Evolutions. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1): 1-75.
Bordo, M.D., and L. Jonung (1999). The Future of EMU: What Does the History of Monetary Unions Tell Us?
NBER Working Papers 7365. Cambridge, Mass.
Buiter, W.H. (1999). Alice in Euroland. Journal of Common Market Studies 37 (2): 181-209.
Decressin, J., and A. Fatas (1995). Regional Labor Market Dynamics in Europe. European Economic Review 39
(9): 1627-1655.
Dohse, D., and C. Krieger-Boden (1998). Wahrungsunion und Arbeitsmarkt: Auftakt zu unabdingbaren Re-
formen. Kieler Studien 290. Tubingen.
Dornbusch, R. (2000). World Economic Trends. February, Mimeo.
European Central Bank (ECB). Monthly Report. Frankfurt am Main.
Eichengreen, B.J., and C. Wyplosz (1998). The Stability Pact: More Than a Minor Nuisance? In D. Begg, J. von
Hagen, C. Wyplosz, and K.F. Zimmermann (eds.), EMU: Prospects and Challenges for the Euro. Oxford.
Feldstein, M. (1992). The Case against EMU. The Economist, June 13.
— (1993). Why Maastricht Will (Still) Fail. The National Interest 32: 19-22.
— (1997). The Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary Union: Political Sources of an Eco-
nomic Liability. Journal of Economic Perspectives 11 (4): 23-42.
— (2000). The European Central Bank and the Euro: The First Year. American Economic Association, Papers
and Proceedings. Forthcoming.
Fidrmuc, J., J. Horvath, and J. Fidrmuc (1999). Stability of Monetary Unions: Lessons form the Break-Up of
Czechoslovakia. ZEI Working Paper B 17. Zentrum flir Europaische Integrationsforschung, Bonn.
Funke, M. (1997). The Nature of Shocks in Europe and Germany. Economica 64 (255): 461—469.
Hagen, J. von, and B.J. Eichengreen (1996). Federalism, Fiscal Restraints, and European Monetary Union.
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 86 (2): 134-138.
Issing, O. (1999). The Eurosystem: Transparent and Accountable or "Willem in Euroland." Journal of Common
Market Studies 37 (3): 503-519.
Kletzer, K., and J. von Hagen (2000). Monetary Union and Fiscal Federalism. ZEI Working Paper B 1. Zentrum
fur Europaische Integrationsforschung, Bonn.
Krugman, P. (1993). Six Skeptical Propositions about EMU. Greek Economic Review 15 (1): 93-104.
Lannoo, K. (1999). Financial Supervision in EMU. Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.19
Lohmann, S. (1996). Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Necessary Conditions for Price Stability in Europe. In H.
Siebert (ed.), Monetary Policy in an Integrated World Economy. Symposium 1995. Tubingen.
Lucas Jr., R.E. (1976). Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique. In K. Brunner and A.H. Meltzer (eds.), The
Phillips Curve and Labor Markets. Amsterdam.
Mundell, R.A. (1961). A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas. American Economic Review 51: 657-665.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development) (1999). Challenges for the ECB. Financial
Market Trends 72. Paris.
Padoa-Schioppa, Th. (1999). EMU and Banking Supervision. Special Paper Series, LSE Financial Markets
Group 112. London School of Economics, London.
Sachs, J., and X. Sala-i-Martin (-1992). Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe
from the United States. In M.B. Canzoneri, V. Grilli, and P. Masson (eds.), Establishing a Central Bank:
Issues in Europe and Lessons from the United States. Cambridge.
Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (1998). Vor weitreichenden Ent-
scheidungen. Jahresgutachten 1998/1999. Stuttgart.
— (1999). Wirtschaftspolitik unter Reformdruck. Jahresgutachten 1999/2000. Stuttgart.
Samuelson, P.A. (1964). Theoretical Notes on Trade Problems. Review of Economics and Statistics 46: 145-154.
Siebert, H. (1997). Labor Market Rigidities: At the Root of Unemployment in Europe. Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 11 (3): 37-54.
— (1998a). Arbeitslos ohne Ende. Strategien fur mehr Beschaftigung. Wiesbaden.
— (1998b). The Euro: A Dozen Do's and Don't's. Kiel Discussion Papers 312. Institut fur Weltwirtschaft, Kiel.
— (1999a). The World Economy. London.
— (1999b). Depolitisering van geldschepping essentiell. De Standaard, August 11.
— (2000a). AuBenwirtschaft. 7th ed. Stuttgart. Forthcoming.
— (2000b). Zum Paradigma des Standortwettbewerbs. Schriftenreihe Beitrage zur Ordnungstheorie und
Ordnungspolitik. Walter Eucken Institut, Freiburg. Forthcoming.
Smets, F. (2000). Monetary Policy in the Euro Area: The First Year of the Eurosystem. Paper presented at the
24th Flemish Economic Conference 2000. Gent.
Soltwedel, R., D. Dohse, and C. Krieger-Boden (1999). EMU Challenges European Labor Markets. IMF
Working Paper 99/131. International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
Wyplosz, C. (1999). Economic Policy Coordination in EMU: Strategies and Institutions. In Financial Super-
vision and Policy Coordination in the EMU, Deutsch-Franzosisches Wirtschaftspolitisches Forum: 36-60.